Social Welfare and Collective Goods Coercion in Public Economics

Posted: 28 Mar 2007

See all articles by Stanley L. Winer

Stanley L. Winer

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration; Carleton University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

George Tridimas

University of Ulster - School of Economics

Walter Hettich

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics

Date Written: Janury 24, 2007

Abstract

This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which coercion stemming from the provision of public goods is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into social welfare optimization. The paper examines the implications for optimal policy, showing how the Samuelson condition, rules for optimal linear income taxation and commodity taxation, and for the marginal cost of public funds must be modified. In addition, the trade-off between social welfare and coercion is mapped under specific conditions and the implications of this trade-off for normative policy choice are considered.

Keywords: Coercion, optimal linear income taxation, optimal commodity taxation, marginal cost of public funds, public goods, collective choice

JEL Classification: D70, H10, H20, H21

Suggested Citation

Winer, Stanley L. and Tridimas, George and Hettich, Walter, Social Welfare and Collective Goods Coercion in Public Economics (Janury 24, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=970979

Stanley L. Winer (Contact Author)

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada
613-520-2600 x2630 (Phone)
613-520-2551 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carleton.ca/winer

Carleton University - Department of Economics ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada
613-520-2600 ex.2630 (Phone)
613-520-2551 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carleton.ca/winer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

George Tridimas

University of Ulster - School of Economics ( email )

Shore Road
Newtownabbey
Co Antrim, Northern Ireland BT37 0QB BT37 0QB
United Kingdom

Walter Hettich

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics ( email )

Fullerton, CA 92834
United States

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