Financing Frictions and the Substitution Between Internal and External Funds

Abstract

There is ample empirical evidence of a negative relation between internal funds (profitability) and the demand for external funds (debt issuance). This negative relation has been interpreted as evidence for external financing costs arising from capital market frictions such as asymmetric information (e.g., the pecking order theory). We show, however, that the negative effect of internal funds on the demand for external financing is concentrated among firms that are \QTR{em}{least likely} to face high costs of external finance (firms that distribute large amounts of dividends, that are large, and whose bonds and commercial papers are rated). For firms in the other end of the spectrum (low payout, small, and unrated), external financing is insensitive to innovations to internal funds. These cross-firm differences hold separately for debt and outside equity financing, and are magnified in the aftermath of macroeconomic movements that tighten financial constraints. We argue that the greater degree of complementarity between internal funds and external finance for constrained firms is a consequence of the interdependence of their financing and investment decisions. Our findings suggest that the negative relation between internal funds and external financing should not be interpreted as evidence for external financing costs.

Keywords: Capital structure, external financing, pecking order, financial constraints, investment, GMM, business cycles

JEL Classification: G31