Download This PaperAtlantic Divide or Gulf Stream Convergence: Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States
56 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2007 Last revised: 19 Jul 2010
Date Written: April 13, 2010
Abstract
We collect a sample of EU and US in-depth merger investigation, estimate models of the regulatory decisions and use the models to compare merger policies in the two jurisdictions. The approach used allows us to decompose observed differences between merger decisions into regime effects and case-mix effects. Focusing on dominant-firm mergers, we find that EU is tougher than the US on average and on mergers resulting in low market shares. We also find that US policy is more affected than EU policy by a range of market considerations.
Keywords: merger policy, antitrust, market dominance
JEL Classification: K21, L22, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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