Debt Restructurings, Holdouts, and Exit Consents
34 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2007 Last revised: 23 Apr 2020
This paper investigates the use of exit consents in a sample of bond exchange offers. We find that exit consents are common, approximately 56% of the exchange offers in our sample have them and 60% of the exit consents are by non-financially distressed firms. Using a probit model, we find that a set of variables that proxy for hold out problems is able to significantly explain the use of exit consents. Reducing holdouts is necessary for timely and efficient debt restructurings and achieving financial stability particularly in sovereign debt markets.
Keywords: Exit consents, debt restructuring, workouts, consent solicitation, debt renegotiation, exchange offers, tender offers, coercion, and holdouts
JEL Classification: G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation