The Economics of Cartels

Finnish Competition Law Yearbook, 2006

19 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2007

See all articles by Cento Veljanovski

Cento Veljanovski

Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs

Abstract

This paper sets out the basic economics of cartel formation and stability, the methods of estimating overcharges and "but for" prices, and concludes with a brief discussion of multiple damages. It draws on some evidence of cartel prosecution in Europe.

Keywords: price fixing, cartel, overcharges, cartel damages

JEL Classification: L4

Suggested Citation

Veljanovski, Cento, The Economics of Cartels. Finnish Competition Law Yearbook, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=975612

Cento Veljanovski (Contact Author)

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