Generalized Vickrey Auctions

7 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2007  

Hal R. Varian

University of California, Berkeley - School of Information; University of California, Berkeley - Operations and Information Technology Management Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

UC Berkeley; University of Michigan

Date Written: 1994

Abstract

We describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.

Suggested Citation

Varian, Hal R. and MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., Generalized Vickrey Auctions (1994). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=975873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.975873

Hal R. Varian

University of California, Berkeley - School of Information ( email )

102 South Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
United States
510-642-9980 (Phone)
510-642-5814 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/biography.html

University of California, Berkeley - Operations and Information Technology Management Group ( email )

545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-643-6388 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason (Contact Author)

UC Berkeley ( email )

102 South Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jeff-mason.com

University of Michigan ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1092
United States

HOME PAGE: http://http:/jeff-mason.com/

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