Complementarity, Coordination, and Credit
CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/17
20 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2007
Date Written: April 2004
Abstract
We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementarity activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem. Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus of the project is not maximized.
Keywords: complementarity, inside and outside coordination, moral hazard
JEL Classification: D21, D82, O32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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