A Global Market for Judicial Services

69 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2007 Last revised: 3 Mar 2015

Jens Dammann

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Henry Hansmann

Yale Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: March 15, 2007

Abstract

The world's nations vary widely in the quality of their judicial systems. In some jurisdictions, the courts resolve disputes quickly, fairly, and economically. In others, they are slow, inefficient, biased, incompetent, or corrupt. These differences are important not just for litigants, but for nations as a whole: effective courts are important for economic development.

A natural implication is that countries with underperforming judiciaries should reform their courts. Yet reform is both difficult and slow. Another way to deal with a dysfunctional court system is for litigants from afflicted nations to have their cases adjudicated in the courts of other nations that have better-functioning judicial systems. We explore here the promise of such cross-jurisdictional litigation, and the reforms needed to make it succeed.

The issue is timely. The increasing pace of global commerce is creating pressures for legal reforms that will dramatically improve the legal environment for litigating across borders. Moreover, advances in transportation and telecommunications are making it increasingly practical for parties to litigate in remote courts. Just as residents of New York City now commonly obtain assistance with utility bills and computer software telephonically from service personnel in Bangalore, it should become possible for merchants in Bangalore to have their disputes decided in New York courts via the internet.

Keywords: Judicial services, arbitration, courts, competition, choice of forum, international litigation, choice of law, corporations, regulatory competition, development

JEL Classification: F13, K12, K33, K41, O19

Suggested Citation

Dammann, Jens and Hansmann, Henry, A Global Market for Judicial Services (March 15, 2007). U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 98; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 347. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976115 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976115

Jens Dammann

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States

Henry Hansmann (Contact Author)

Yale Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4966 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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