Incentives for Auditor Collusion in Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Regulatory Environment
Posted: 30 Mar 2007
Date Written: March 20, 2007
Abstract
This paper develops a single-play game theory model that looks at the strategic interactions between auditors and managers. This paper adds to the literature by explicitly modeling the possibility of collusion in a context where the outcome is unverifiable and the manager has the possibility of funding side-payments in such a way that they have little effect on his personal payoff.
Keywords: Auditing, Collusion, Game theory
JEL Classification: C72, D82, G18, G38, K22, M49, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brown, Abigail B., Incentives for Auditor Collusion in Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Regulatory Environment (March 20, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976169
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