Ownership, Board Structure, and the Informativeness of Earnings - Evidence from an Emerging Market

37 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2007

See all articles by Michael Firth

Michael Firth

Lingnan University - Department of Finance and Insurance

Peter M.Y. Fung

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Oliver M. Rui

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS); affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

This study extends previous research by empirically examining how ownership and board structure affect the informativeness of earnings for companies listed in China. We proxy informativeness of earnings by the earnings-returns relationship and discretionary accruals. The results show that different ownership (government, legal entity, and foreign) and board structures affect the informativeness of accounting earnings. Our research has implications for China's regulators who are striving to improve accounting information, transparency, and corporate governance.

Keywords: Informativeness of Earnings, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G34, J63, L14

Suggested Citation

Firth, Michael and Fung, Peter M.Y. and Rui, Oliver M. and Rui, Oliver M., Ownership, Board Structure, and the Informativeness of Earnings - Evidence from an Emerging Market (January 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976581

Michael Firth

Lingnan University - Department of Finance and Insurance ( email )

Castle Peak Road
Tuen Mun, New Territories
Hong Kong
China
+852 2616 8160 (Phone)
+852 2466 4751 (Fax)

Peter M.Y. Fung

Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

Hung Hom, Kowloon
Hong Kong

Oliver M. Rui (Contact Author)

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) ( email )

699 Hong Feng Road
Pudong
Shanghai 201206
China
86-21-28905618 (Phone)
86-21-28905620 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ceibs.edu/rui-oliver

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
584
Abstract Views
3,175
Rank
93,786
PlumX Metrics