Market Games and Successive Oligopolies

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2007/10

11 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2007

See all articles by Jean J. Gabszewicz

Jean J. Gabszewicz

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Didier Laussel

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM); University of the Mediterranean

Tanguy Van Ypersele

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Skerdilajda Zanaj

Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under different technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.

Keywords: Successive oligopolies, market games, entry, double marginalization

JEL Classification: D43, L1, L13, L22

Suggested Citation

Gabszewicz, Jean J. and Laussel, Didier and Van Ypersele, Tanguy and Zanaj, Skerdilajda, Market Games and Successive Oligopolies (February 2007). CORE Discussion Paper No. 2007/10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976873

Jean J. Gabszewicz (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Didier Laussel

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2, rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France

University of the Mediterranean

58, Bd Charles Livon
Marseille, 13 002
France

Tanguy Van Ypersele

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2 rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France
+33 4 4293 5983 (Phone)
+33 4 4293 0968 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Skerdilajda Zanaj

Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

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