Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice

61 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2007

See all articles by Alma Cohen

Alma Cohen

Harvard Law School; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Liran Einav

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We estimate the distribution of risk preferences using a large data set of deductible choices in auto insurance contracts. To do so, we develop a structural econometric model of adverse selection that allows for unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (claim rate) and risk aversion. We use data on realized claims to estimate the distribution of claim rates and data on deductible and premium choices to estimate the distribution of risk aversion and how it correlates with risk. We find large heterogeneity in risk attitudes: while the majority of individuals are almost risk neutral with respect to lotteries of 100 dollar magnitude, an important fraction of the individuals exhibit significant risk aversion even with respect to such relatively small bets. The estimates imply that women are more risk averse than men, that risk aversion exhibits a U-shape with respect to age, and that most proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is more important than that of risk, and risk and risk aversion are positively correlated.

Keywords: risk aversion, adverse selection, structural estimation, mixture models

JEL Classification: D82, G22

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Alma and Einav, Liran, Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice. American Economic Review, Vol. 97, pp. 745-788, 2007, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 582, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=977586

Alma Cohen (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Liran Einav

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-3704 (Phone)
928-223-4973 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
431
Abstract Views
6,576
Rank
105,312
PlumX Metrics