Legislative Process With Open Rules

CER-ETH Working Paper No. 07/64

35 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2007

See all articles by Theresa Fahrenberger

Theresa Fahrenberger

Heidelberg University - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.

Keywords: Baron/Ferejohn model, bargaining in legislatures, open rules, three-group

JEL Classification: D7

Suggested Citation

Fahrenberger, Theresa and Gersbach, Hans, Legislative Process With Open Rules (February 2007). CER-ETH Working Paper No. 07/64. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=977897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.977897

Theresa Fahrenberger (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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