Choosing the Legal Retirement Age in Presence of Unemployment

25 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2007

See all articles by Georges Casamatta

Georges Casamatta

Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Caroline De Paoli

University of Toulouse 1 - Manufacture des Tabacs; École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Laboratoire d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (LEA)

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Date Written: March 31, 2007

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to better understand the impact of unemployment on the design of Pay-As-You-Go pension systems, in the context of population aging.

We consider a model in which people differ according to age and face in every period a given probability of becoming unemployed.

We first determine the optimal pension system, which consists in a payroll tax rate, a pension benefit level and a retirement age and study its comparative statistics with respect to a change of the unemployment rate and the length of life.

We then characterize the issue-by-issue voting equilibrium and compare it to the optimal pension scheme. It is shown that the median voter in general chooses a retirement age lower than the optimal one as well as a higher payroll tax rate.

Suggested Citation

Casamatta, Georges and De Paoli, Caroline and De Paoli, Caroline, Choosing the Legal Retirement Age in Presence of Unemployment (March 31, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=977907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.977907

Georges Casamatta (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs (bât. F)
21 Allee de Brienne
31000 Toulouse
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Caroline De Paoli

University of Toulouse 1 - Manufacture des Tabacs ( email )

21, allée de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France

École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Laboratoire d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (LEA) ( email )

48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France

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