Substitutability and Protectionism: Latin America's Trade Policy and Imports from China and India

33 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Giovanni Facchini

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute

Marcelo Olarreaga

University of Geneva; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Peri A. Silva

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University; IfW Kiel; KU Leuven; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 1, 2007

Abstract

The authors examine the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is imported from these countries, they extend the protection for sale model to allow for different degrees of substitutability between domestically produced and imported varieties. The extension suggests that higher levels of protection toward Chinese goods can be explained by high substitutability between domestically produced goods and Chinese goods, whereas lower levels of protection toward goods imported from India can be explained by low substitutability with domestically produced goods. The data support the extension to the protection for salemodel, which performs better than the original specification in terms of explaining Latin America's structure of protection.

Keywords: Economic Theory & Research, Markets and Market Access, Free Trade, Globalization and Financial Integration, International Trade and Trade Rules

Suggested Citation

Facchini, Giovanni and Olarreaga, Marcelo and Silva, Peri A. and Willmann, Gerald, Substitutability and Protectionism: Latin America's Trade Policy and Imports from China and India (April 1, 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4188, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=978342

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://paople.few.eur.nl/facchini

Marcelo Olarreaga

University of Geneva ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Peri A. Silva

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

410 David Kinley Hall
1407 W. Gregory
Urbana, IL 61801
United States
217-333 0120 (Phone)
217-244-6678 (Fax)

Gerald Willmann (Contact Author)

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universitätsstraße 25
Bielefeld, NRW 33613
Germany

IfW Kiel ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, Schleswig-Hosltein D-24100
Germany

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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