Factions and Political Competition

58 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2007 Last revised: 19 Jul 2010

See all articles by Nicola Persico

Nicola Persico

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Jose Rodriguez-Pueblita

McKinsey & Company

Dan Silverman

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.

Suggested Citation

Persico, Nicola and Rodriguez-Pueblita, Jose Carlos and Silverman, Dan, Factions and Political Competition (April 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=978910

Nicola Persico

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Jose Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita

McKinsey & Company ( email )

Paseo de la Reforma 505
Col. Cuauhtemoc
06500 Mexico City
Mexico

Dan Silverman (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics Department ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-764-2447 (Phone)
734-764-2769 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.lsa.umich.edu/

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