Folk Theorems for Infinitely Repeated Games Played by Organizations with Short-Lived Members

33 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2007

See all articles by Hajime Kobayashi

Hajime Kobayashi

Kansai University - Faculty of Economics

Abstract

We consider infinitely repeated games played by organizations with short-lived members. Each member enters the organization with no prior memory. He plays the role of taking actions for stage games in the first half of his lifetime. In the beginning of the second half, when a new member enters the organization, the existing member privately sends a message to the new member. He remains in the organization for the second half, and then retires from the game. We prove that folk theorems hold in this environment; that is, organizations essentially implement Fudenberg and Maskin strategies.

Suggested Citation

Kobayashi, Hajime, Folk Theorems for Infinitely Repeated Games Played by Organizations with Short-Lived Members. International Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 517-549, May 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=979635 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00436.x

Hajime Kobayashi (Contact Author)

Kansai University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

3-3-35 Yamatecho
Suita, Osaka, 564-8680
Japan

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