The Effects of Leniency Programs and Fines on Cartel Stability
13 Pages Posted: 2 May 2007
Abstract
Using a stylized oligopoly model, we analyze the effect of cartel deterring fines, taking into consideration exemptions granted to cartel members cooperating with the competition authorities. We conclude that the fines can act as a deterrent to breaking collusive agreements, thus stabilizing the cartel.
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The Effects of Leniency Programs and Fines on Cartel Stability
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