Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations

29 Pages Posted: 2 May 2007

See all articles by Valeria Costantini

Valeria Costantini

University of Rome III - Department of Economics

Riccardo Crescenzi

University of Rome III - Department of Economics

Fabrizio de Filippis

University of Rome III - Department of Economics

Luca Salvatici

Università Roma Tre - Dipartimento di Economia

Abstract

This paper aims to understand the structural features of bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor considering general economics indicators, development levels, structure of agricultural sectors and trade policies. Bargaining coalitions are analysed by grouping countries using a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the identification of possible 'defectors', i.e. countries that, according to their economic conditions and policies, seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join. In addition, the ex-post analysis of the counterfactual coalitions sheds light on the distance between different coalitions as well as between individual countries and the best alternative group available. Empirical results confirm our research hypothesis: clusters of structurally homogeneous countries well represent existing bargaining coalitions. In particular, the G-20 shows a high degree of internal coherence, which, in our framework, may provide a clue to the 'sustainability' of this coalition and to its relevance in the Doha Round negotiations.

Suggested Citation

Costantini, Valeria and Crescenzi, Riccardo and de Filippis, Fabrizio and Salvatici, Luca, Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations. The World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 863-891, May 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=981620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01015.x

Valeria Costantini (Contact Author)

University of Rome III - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Silvio D'Amico, 77
00145 Rome, 00145
Italy
+39 06 5711 4723 (Phone)

Riccardo Crescenzi

University of Rome III - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Ostiense, 139
Rome, 00154
Italy

Fabrizio De Filippis

University of Rome III - Department of Economics ( email )

via Ostiense, 139
Rome, 00154
Italy

Luca Salvatici

Università Roma Tre - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Via Ostiense, 159
Roma, RM 00145
Italy
+390657335737 (Phone)

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