Overcoming Inaction Through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory

Organization Studies, Vol. 28, No. 7, pp. 1079-1100, 2007

38 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2007

See all articles by Frank Wijen

Frank Wijen

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)

Shaz Ansari

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School; Erasmus University, Rotterdam (EUR)

Abstract

Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and regime theories to identify drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship and develop an analytical framework. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to illustrate how collective inaction was overcome to realize a global regulatory institution, the Kyoto Protocol.

Keywords: collective institutional entrepreneurship, institutional theory, regime theory, collective action, public policy, climate change, global regulatory institution, Kyoto Protocol

JEL Classification: D70, Q20, Q40

Suggested Citation

Wijen, Frank and Ansari, Shahzad, Overcoming Inaction Through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory. Organization Studies, Vol. 28, No. 7, pp. 1079-1100, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=981759

Frank Wijen (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Room T07-38
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
31 10 4081985 (Phone)

Shahzad Ansari

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

Erasmus University, Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

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