Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law

52 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2007

Abstract

Congress regularly enacts statutes that share government authority among many political institutions. This paper analyzes how administrative law does and should treat agency statutory interpretation in these overlapping and underlapping jurisdictional schemes. Shared jurisdiction statutes alter the incentives of administrative agencies, and can sometimes be effective tools for managing the principal-agent problems inherent in delegation. Unfortunately, judges regularly employ interpretive practices that undermine, rather than support these regimes. Particularly, in the context of Chevron doctrine - where problems of this sort arise most often - current judicial practices are in tension with the most sensible reconstruction of congressional intent.

Keywords: jurisdictional schemes

Suggested Citation

Gersen, Jacob E., Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law. Supreme Court Review, Vol. 2006, p. 201, 2007; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 161. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=981765

Jacob E. Gersen (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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