Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence

47 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2007

See all articles by Emrah Arbak

Emrah Arbak

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS); University of Lyon II - Groupe dAnalyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially if the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to understand what motivates these seemingly selfless individuals to lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. Even though it turns out to be costly on average, a large proportion of our subjects volunteer to lead. Our findings suggest that a fraction of these leaders are socially concerned, while others expect to distill some personal gain, possibly of non-pecuniary nature. The composition of the team also matters, as publicizing certain attributes of a subject's teammates has an impact on her decision to lead. Lastly, though voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team, they are not necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.

Keywords: leadership, endogenous selection, influence, voluntary contribution, experiment

JEL Classification: M54, J33, A13, C92, D63

Suggested Citation

Arbak, Emrah and Villeval, Marie Claire, Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence (April 2007). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2732. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982143

Emrah Arbak

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) ( email )

1 Place du Congrès
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

University of Lyon II - Groupe dAnalyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Marie Claire Villeval (Contact Author)

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/villeval/villeval.html

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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