Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets

32 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2007

See all articles by Michael Ostrovsky

Michael Ostrovsky

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, benchmark, amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

Keywords: microeconomics, matching, economic theory

JEL Classification: C78

Suggested Citation

Ostrovsky, Michael and Schwarz, Michael, Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets (April 2007). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1965, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982249 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.982249

Michael Ostrovsky (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/ostrovsky/

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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