A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and Ratification of the International Criminal Court

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 659-670, 2009

26 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2007 Last revised: 31 Mar 2014

See all articles by Eric Neumayer

Eric Neumayer

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: August 31, 2009

Abstract

The newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) promises justice to the victims of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Past offenders can be punished, while future potential offenders may be deterred by the prospect of punishment. Yet, justice is no substitute for intervention for the benefit of people at acute risk of being victimized. The Court may create a new moral hazard problem if the promise of ex post justice makes it easier for states to shy away from incurring the costs of intervention. This article indirectly tests for the relevance of this potential problem by estimating the determinants of ratification delay to the Rome Statute of the ICC. I find that countries, which in the past have been more willing to intervene in foreign civil wars and more willing to contribute troops to multinational peacekeeping missions are more likely to have ratified the Statute (early on). This suggests that the Court is a complement to, not a substitute for intervention.

Suggested Citation

Neumayer, Eric, A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and Ratification of the International Criminal Court (August 31, 2009). Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 659-670, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982540

Eric Neumayer (Contact Author)

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) ( email )

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