Product Specific Rules of Origin in EU and Us Preferential Trading Arrangements: an Assessment

World Trade Review, July 2006

Posted: 30 Apr 2007

See all articles by Olivier Cadot

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Céline Carrère

University of Geneva

Jaime de Melo

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Bolormaa Tumurchudur

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne)

Abstract

Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal, we construct a synthetic index (R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness of rules of origin (PSRO) in preferential trading agreements. The R-index is applied to NAFTA and the Single List of the EU's PANEURO system covering all of the EU's preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how a common set of rules of origin can affect countries, differently depending on their export structures, and how their complexity varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to explain differences in the rate at which preferences are used. Finally, we compute estimates of the compliance costs associated with rules of origin under NAFTA and the Single List and find them to be between 6.8% of good value (NAFTA) and 8% (PANEURO).

Keywords: Rules of Origin, preferential trade agreements, market access, NAFTA, PANEURO

JEL Classification: F13, F15

Suggested Citation

Cadot, Olivier and Carrère, Céline and de Melo, Jaime and Tumurchudur, Bolorma, Product Specific Rules of Origin in EU and Us Preferential Trading Arrangements: an Assessment. World Trade Review, July 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982930

Olivier Cadot (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Céline Carrère

University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Jaime De Melo

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )

40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 705 8273 (Phone)
+41 22 705 8293 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/demelo/Jaime.html

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Bolorma Tumurchudur

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

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