Don't Cry for Me? Reforming and Defusing Checks and Balances in Argentina

21 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2007

See all articles by Carlos Santiso

Carlos Santiso

United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID); Center for the Implementation of Public Policies for Equity and Growth, CIPPEC; Center for Democratic Governance, CGD, of Burkina Faso; African Development Bank; Inter-American Development Bank

Date Written: May 12, 2007

Abstract

How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinizing government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries.

Keywords: Argentina, national audit office, checks and balances, government auditing, corruption, political economy, financial governance, fiscal control, legislative oversight

JEL Classification: H11, H61, O54, P16

Suggested Citation

Santiso, Carlos, Don't Cry for Me? Reforming and Defusing Checks and Balances in Argentina (May 12, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983367 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983367

Carlos Santiso (Contact Author)

United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) ( email )

Abercrombie House
Eaglesham Road, East Kilbride
Glasgow, G75 8EA
United Kingdom
+44 0 1355 84 4000 (Phone)
+44 0 1355 84 4099 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/

Center for the Implementation of Public Policies for Equity and Growth, CIPPEC ( email )

Argentina

Center for Democratic Governance, CGD, of Burkina Faso ( email )

Burkina Faso

African Development Bank ( email )

15 Avenue du Ghana
P.O.Box 323-1002
Tunis-Belvedère
Tunisia

HOME PAGE: http://www.afdb.org

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.iadb.org

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