Don't Cry for Me? Reforming and Defusing Checks and Balances in Argentina
21 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2007
Date Written: May 12, 2007
How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinizing government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries.
Keywords: Argentina, national audit office, checks and balances, government auditing, corruption, political economy, financial governance, fiscal control, legislative oversight
JEL Classification: H11, H61, O54, P16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation