33 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2007
Date Written: April 25, 2007
We develop a model of investment with financial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between investment and Tobin's q. A firm is financed partly by insiders, who control its assets, and partly by outside investors. When their wealth is scarce, insiders earn a rate of return higher than the market rate of return, i.e., they receive a quasi-rent on invested capital. This rent is priced into the value of the firm, so Tobin's q is driven by two forces: changes in the value of invested capital, and changes in the value of the insiders' future rents per unit of capital. This weakens the correlation between q and investment, relative to the frictionless benchmark. We present a calibrated version of the model, which, due to this effect, generate realistic correlations between investment, q, and cash flow.
Keywords: Financial constraints, investment, Tobin's q, limited enforcement.
JEL Classification: E22, E30, E44, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lorenzoni, Guido and Walentin, Karl, Financial Frictions Investment and Tobin's q (April 25, 2007). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 07-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983421