References (63)


Citations (21)



Taxation and Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach

Mihir A. Desai

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Dhammika Dharmapala

University of Chicago Law School

April 2007

How do the tax system and corporate governance arrangements interact? This chapter begins by reviewing an emerging literature that explores how agency problems create such interactions and provides evidence on their importance. This literature has neglected how taxation can interact with the various mechanisms that have arisen to ameliorate the corporate governance problem, such as concentrated ownership, accounting and information systems, high-powered incentives, financing choices, payout policy, and the market for corporate control. The remainder of the chapter outlines potentially fruitful areas for future research into how these mechanisms may respond to the tax system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Taxes, tax avoidance, tax shelters, governance, firm value

JEL Classification: G32, H25, H26, K34

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: May 3, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Desai, Mihir A. and Dharmapala, Dhammika, Taxation and Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach (April 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983563

Contact Information

Mihir A. Desai
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6693 (Phone)
617-496-6592 (Fax)
Dhammika Dharmapala (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,839
Downloads: 1,861
Download Rank: 5,622
References:  63
Citations:  21
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper