The Intra-Alliance Division of Value Created through Collaboration

Posted: 3 May 2007 Last revised: 29 Oct 2015

J. Adetunji Adegbesan

Pan-African University - Lagos Business School

Matthew John Higgins

Georgia Institute of Technology & NBER; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 8, 2009

Abstract

The differential benefits reaped by individual partners are a major determinant of the impact of strategic alliances on firm performance, and an important (dis)incentive for alliance partners to collaborate in value creation. Theoretically, however, we lack an explicit theory of intra-alliance value division, and empirically, previous analysis has been hampered by methodological challenges. In response, therefore, we propose a bargaining framework for intra-alliance value appropriation, as well as a measure for capturing its variation. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 200 biotechnology R&D alliances, and find that we are able to explain variation in value appropriation across alliance partners, partner types, and individual firms of each type.

Keywords: Strategic alliances; intra-alliance bargaining; value appropriation; resource-based view; strategic factor markets; control rights

Suggested Citation

Adegbesan, J. Adetunji and Higgins, Matthew John, The Intra-Alliance Division of Value Created through Collaboration (November 8, 2009). IESE Business School Working Paper No. 667. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983937

Joseph Adetunji Adegbesan (Contact Author)

Pan-African University - Lagos Business School ( email )

2 Ahmed Onibudo Street
P. O. Box 73688
Victoria Island, Lagos 101007
Nigeria
+234-1-7740280 (Phone)
+234-1-4616173 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lbs.edu.ng

Matthew John Higgins

Georgia Institute of Technology & NBER ( email )

800 West Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
404-894-4368 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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