How Multinational Investors Evade Developed Country Laws

12 Pages Posted: 3 May 2007

See all articles by Theodore Moran

Theodore Moran

Georgetown University; Center for Global Development

Date Written: February 2006

Abstract

How effective are G-8 and OECD efforts to combat bribery and corrupt payments when multinational companies bid on concessions in the developing world? Have the rich countries-- and the United States, in particular--done what is necessary to restrain multinational investors from paying off daughters of Presidents and cronies of Ministers to secure favors for their activities?

This paper argues that the answer is no. Multinational corporations from the US, Europe, and Japan have devised sophisticated payment mechanisms, as documented and described here, to evade home country anti-corruption laws, including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, with impunity. According to this paper, some US companies have laid these payment arrangements out before the US Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other US agencies, without arousing any objection whatsoever.

Without reforms of the kind spelled out here, the OECD and G-8 campaign to prevent corrupt payments will turn out to be a sham. This working paper provides a preview of research included in a much broader CGD monograph entitled Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Policies for Developed and Developing Countries.

Keywords: G-8, OECD, corruption, concessions, multinational companies

JEL Classification: E0, O0

Suggested Citation

Moran, Theodore, How Multinational Investors Evade Developed Country Laws (February 2006). Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 79, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=984044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.984044

Theodore Moran (Contact Author)

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Center for Global Development

2055 L St. NW
5th floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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