Duopoly Dynamics With a Barrier to Entry

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 07-037/3

31 Pages Posted: 8 May 2007

See all articles by Jaap H. Abbring

Jaap H. Abbring

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tinbergen Institute; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jeffrey R. Campbell

University of Notre Dame; Tilburg University

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite-horizon Markov-perfect duopoly dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids future fixed costs. We focus on the unique equilibrium with last-in first-out expectations: A firm never exits leaving behind an active younger rival. We prove that raising a second producer's sunk entry cost in an industry that supports at most two firms reduces the probability of having a duopoly but increases the probability that some firm will serve the industry. Numerical experiments indicate that a barrier to entry's quantitative relevance depends on demand shocks' serial correlation. If they are not very persistent, the direct entry-deterring effect of a barrier to a second firm's entry greatly reduces the average number of active firms. The indirect entry-encouraging effect does little to offset this. With highly persistent demand shocks, the direct effect is small and the barrier to entry has no substantial effect on the number of competitors. This confirms Carlton's (2004) assertion that the effects of a barrier depend crucially on industry dynamics that two-stage "short run/long run" models capture poorly.

Keywords: LIFO, FIFO, Sunk costs, Markov-perfect equilibrium, Competition policy

JEL Classification: L13, L41

Suggested Citation

Abbring, Jaap H. and Campbell, Jeffrey R., Duopoly Dynamics With a Barrier to Entry (April 2007). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 07-037/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=984831 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.984831

Jaap H. Abbring (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/abbring/

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/abbring/

Tinbergen Institute

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Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tinbergen.nl

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jeffrey R. Campbell

University of Notre Dame ( email )

United States

Tilburg University ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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