On the Self-Serving Use of Equity Principles in International Climate Negotiations

35 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2010

See all articles by Andreas Lange

Andreas Lange

University of Hamburg

Andreas Löschel

University of Muenster - Chair of Microeconomics, esp. Energy and Resource Economics

Carsten Vogt

Zentrum fuer EuropSische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research), Environmental & Resource Economics

Andreas Ziegler

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outcomes. We first advance bargaining theory to incorporate the self-serving use of equity. Agents are predicted to push equity principles which benefit them more than other parties, in particular those which are disadvantageous to parties with large bargaining power. Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we then study how participants assess the support of the equity criteria by major parties in the climate negotiations. Comparing these results with cost estimates from a POLES model, we find that the perceived equity preferences of the respective countries or groups of countries are in general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria and thereby lend support for our theoretical model. While this self-interest is recognized by the participants of our survey for the positions of the USA and the G77/China as well as Russia, the EU manages to be seen as choosing (self-serving) equity arguments out of fairness concerns and in order to facilitate the negotiations.

Keywords: bargaining theory, equity criteria, self-serving bias, climate policy, survey data

JEL Classification: C7, D63, H41

Suggested Citation

Lange, Andreas and Löschel, Andreas and Vogt, Carsten and Ziegler, Andreas, On the Self-Serving Use of Equity Principles in International Climate Negotiations (2007). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 07-025. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=985250 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985250

Andreas Lange (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg ( email )

Allende-Platz 1
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Andreas Löschel

University of Muenster - Chair of Microeconomics, esp. Energy and Resource Economics ( email )

Universitätsstr. 14-16
48143 Munster
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/eroe

Carsten Vogt

Zentrum fuer EuropSische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research), Environmental & Resource Economics ( email )

Eco-management
D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211235200 (Phone)
+49 6211235226 (Fax)

Andreas Ziegler

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

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