Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Poland

Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 07-09

35 Pages Posted: 14 May 2007

See all articles by Oskar Kowalewski

Oskar Kowalewski

IESEG School of Management; LEM - CNRS 9221

Ivan Stetsyuk

Temple University - Fox School of Business, Finance Department; University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Faculty of Management (ESG)

Oleksandr Talavera

Swansea University - School of Management

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we explore the determinants of the dividend policy in Poland. Second, we test whether corporate governance practices determine the dividend policy in the non-financial companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange. We compose, for the first time, quantitative measures on the quality of the corporate governance for 110 non-financial listed companies. Our results suggest that large and more profitable companies have a higher dividend payout ratio. Furthermore, riskier and more indebted firms prefer to pay lower dividends. The findings finally, based on the period 1998-2004, demonstrate that an increase in the TDI or its subindices that represent corporate governance practices brings about a statistically significant increase in the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio. Moreover, the estimates prove to be significant after the inclusion of standard additional controls.

Keywords: corporate governance, dividend policy, agency theory

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G35

Suggested Citation

Kowalewski, Oskar and Stetsyuk, Ivan and Stetsyuk, Ivan and Talavera, Oleksandr, Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Poland (2007). Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 07-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=986111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.986111

Oskar Kowalewski (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management ( email )

1 Parvis de La Défense
Socle de la Grande Arche
Paris La Défense cedex, 92044
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.ieseg.fr/en/faculty-and-research/professor/?id=1740

LEM - CNRS 9221 ( email )

Lille
France

HOME PAGE: http://lem.cnrs.fr/

Ivan Stetsyuk

Temple University - Fox School of Business, Finance Department ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
+14436421529 (Phone)

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Faculty of Management (ESG) ( email )

315 St. Catherine Street East
R-2360
Montreal, Quebec H2X 3X2
Canada

Oleksandr Talavera

Swansea University - School of Management ( email )

Haldane Building
Singleton Park
Swansea, SA2 8PP
United Kingdom

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