Information and the Market for Union Representation

63 Pages Posted: 17 May 2007  

Matthew T. Bodie

Saint Louis University School of Law

Abstract

In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create laboratory conditions to determine "the uninhibited desires" of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, however, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This "purchase of services" model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.

Keywords: union, union representation, representation election, labor market

Suggested Citation

Bodie, Matthew T., Information and the Market for Union Representation. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, 2008; Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=987296

Matthew T. Bodie (Contact Author)

Saint Louis University School of Law ( email )

100 N. Tucker Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63101
United States

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