Market and Institutional Determinants in the Regulation of Conveyancers

European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 93-116, 2007

26 Pages Posted: 20 May 2007 Last revised: 21 Jan 2008

See all articles by Benito Arruñada

Benito Arruñada

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona GSE

Date Written: May 2007

Abstract

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

Keywords: Lawyers, notaries, property rights, real estate, transaction costs

JEL Classification: K11, K12

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito, Market and Institutional Determinants in the Regulation of Conveyancers (May 2007). European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 93-116, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=987348

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~arrunada

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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