One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence

66 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2007 Last revised: 23 Jul 2012

See all articles by Renee B. Adams

Renee B. Adams

University of Oxford; ABFER

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2007

Abstract

We survey the empirical literature on disproportional ownership, i.e. the use of mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights in corporations. Our focus is mostly on explicit mechanisms that allow some shareholders to acquire control with less than proportional economic interest in the firm (dual-class equity structures, stock pyramids, cross-ownership, etc.), but we also briefly discuss other mechanisms, such as takeover defenses and fiduciary voting. We provide a broad overview of different areas in this literature and highlight problems of interpretation that may arise because of empirical difficulties. We outline potentially promising areas for future research.

Keywords: Disproportional ownership, mechanisms, control

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Adams, Renée B. and Ferreira, Daniel, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (December 2007). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 177/2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=987488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.987488

Renée B. Adams (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

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Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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United Kingdom

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