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Empirics of Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets

Competition Policy International, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2007

14 Pages Posted: 22 May 2007  

Marc Rysman

Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Recent theoretical research on the implications of two-sided markets is gaining recognition for its implications in antitrust. However, the role of empirical analysis in antitrust cases for two-sided markets has been unexplored thus far. Empirical tools of economics are playing an increasingly large role in antitrust litigation. At the same time, there have been several recent attempts to bring empirical analysis to two-sided markets. To the extent that this empirical work on two-sided markets bares similarities to common empirical tools of antitrust, it can provide a template for how the empirics of antitrust cases will proceed in two-sided markets.

This paper studies several issues in which empirical contributions can impact antitrust in the context of two-sided markets. For each issue, I discuss recent empirical research that exemplifies my point. The first issue I discuss is the implementation of market simulations. Market simulations have an important role in determining relevant markets and the price effects of horizontal coordination.

Keywords: multi-sided platforms, two-sided markets, two-sided platforms, antitrust, antitrust analysis, empirical economics

Suggested Citation

Rysman, Marc, Empirics of Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets. Competition Policy International, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=987856

Marc Rysman (Contact Author)

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-3086 (Phone)
617-353-4449 (Fax)

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