The Cognitive and Behavioral Economics of Envy
28 Pages Posted: 29 May 2007
Date Written: May 2007
Abstract
Economists traditionally model choice as the maximization of a stable utility function. A simple way of modeling envy (though not the only one) is by adding a term which is a negative function of the consumption of the other agent(s) in one's own utility function. This paper briefly reviews some applications and implications of the envy model. While the potential applications of the envy model are increasingly well understood, the cognitive economics of envy is much less well understood. First, an envy model requires a specification of the reference group in relation to which the agent is in a rate race for. Second, envy could operate not between individuals but between groups. Third, and more generally, envy has a 'thick' cognitive component underlying the behavior that is supposed to produce.
Keywords: envy, emotions, cognition, reference group, groups
JEL Classification: C91, D11, D21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences
By Hideshi Itoh
-
Envy and Compassion in Tournaments
By Christian Grund and Dirk Sliwka
-
Contracts and Inequity Aversion
By Florian Englmaier and Achim Wambach
-
Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion
By Florian Englmaier and Achim Wambach
-
The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard With Envious Agents
-
Optimal Incentive Contracts for a Worker Who Envies His Boss
By Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer
-
Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents
By Dominique Demougin, Claude Fluet, ...
-
Inequity Aversion in Tournaments
By Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet
-
Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other
By Anjan V. Thakor and Anand M. Goel