Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance

40 Pages Posted: 30 May 2007

See all articles by Leo E. Strine Jr.

Leo E. Strine Jr.

Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School

Abstract

In this essay, Vice Chancellor Strine reflects on the common interests of those who manage and those who labor for American corporations. The first part of the essay examines aspects of the current corporate governance and economic environment that are putting management and labor under pressure. The concluding section of the essay identifies possible corporate governance initiatives that might - by better focusing stockholder activism in particular and corporate governance more generally on long-term, rather than short-term, corporate performance - generate a more rational system of accountability, that focuses on the durable creation by corporations of wealth through fundamentally sound, long-term business plans.

Keywords: Directors, Boards, Shareholders, Corporate governance, Managers, Corporate elections, Institutional investors, Corporate social responsibility, CSR, Social welfare, Organized labor, Accountability, Durable wealth creation

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Strine Jr., Leo E., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance. Journal of Corporation Law, Fall 2007; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-25; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 585. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=989624

Leo E. Strine Jr. (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,063
Abstract Views
5,509
rank
20,285
PlumX Metrics