Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods

30 Pages Posted: 30 May 2007 Last revised: 2 Feb 2009

See all articles by Kentaro Hatsumi

Kentaro Hatsumi

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: February 1, 2009

Abstract

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.

Keywords: allotment problem, coalitional strategy-proofness, homogeneous indivisible goods, single-peaked preference, uniform probabilistic rule

JEL Classification: C72, D71, D81

Suggested Citation

Hatsumi, Kentaro and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods (February 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=989687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.989687

Kentaro Hatsumi

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
39
Abstract Views
457
PlumX Metrics