Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods
30 Pages Posted: 30 May 2007 Last revised: 2 Feb 2009
Date Written: February 1, 2009
We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.
Keywords: allotment problem, coalitional strategy-proofness, homogeneous indivisible goods, single-peaked preference, uniform probabilistic rule
JEL Classification: C72, D71, D81
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation