Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?
14 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2007
Abstract
Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non-traditional protection such as anti-dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti-dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti-dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti-dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti-dumping protection but also the total number of anti-dumping petitions filed by countries.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Antidumping and Retaliation Threats
By Bruce A. Blonigen and Chad P. Bown
-
Global Antidumping Database Version 1.0
By Chad P. Bown
-
The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings
By Thomas J. Prusa and Susan Skeath
-
The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings
By Susan Skeath and Thomas J. Prusa
-
Trade Deflection and Trade Depression
By Chad P. Bown and Meredith Crowley
-
Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or Retaliation?
By Susan Skeath and Thomas J. Prusa
-
The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings
-
Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why are so Few Challenged?
By Chad P. Bown