Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

14 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2007

See all articles by Robert M. Feinberg

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics

Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non-traditional protection such as anti-dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti-dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti-dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti-dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti-dumping protection but also the total number of anti-dumping petitions filed by countries.

Suggested Citation

Feinberg, Robert M. and Reynolds, Kara M., Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?. The World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 948-961, June 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=990136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01016.x

Robert M. Feinberg (Contact Author)

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3768 (Phone)
202-885-3790 (Fax)

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