Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political Assassinations
Bruno S. Frey
CREMA; Zeppelin University
In the course of history a large number of politicians has been assassinated. A rational choice analysis is used to distinguish the expected marginal benefits of killing, and the marginal cost of attacking a politician. The comparative analysis of various equilibria helps us to gain insights into specific historical events.
The analysis suggests that - in addition to well-known security measures - an extension of democracy, a rule by a committee of several politicians, more decentralization via the division of power and federalism, and a strengthening of civil society significantly reduce politicians' probability of being attacked and killed.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Rational choice, democracy, dictatorship, assassination, deterrence
JEL Classification: D01, D70, K14, K42, Z10working papers series
Date posted: June 2, 2007
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.422 seconds