Retail Gasoline Pricing: What Do We Know?

U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 290, Original Release: May 2007

61 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2007 Last revised: 21 Feb 2008

See all articles by Daniel S. Hosken

Daniel S. Hosken

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission

Christopher T. Taylor

U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

Robert Stanton McMillan

Cauchy Capital

Date Written: February 1, 2008

Abstract

We examine retail gasoline station pricing using three years of weekly prices for 272 stations in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC. We report a number of new empirical findings about station level pricing and describe how these findings relate to existing models of retail pricing. First, we find retail margins change substantially over time (by more than 50%) while the shape of the margin distribution remains relatively constant. Second, the distribution of retail gasoline prices has relatively thick tails. Third, stations frequently change their relative prices and margins. Fourth, there is substantial heterogeneity in pricing behavior: stations charging very low or high prices are more likely to maintain their pricing position than stations charging prices near the mean, even when controlling for permanent differences in marginal costs.

Keywords: Retail Competition, Petroleum Industry

JEL Classification: D4, L44, L81

Suggested Citation

Hosken, Daniel S. and Taylor, Christopher T. and McMillan, Robert Stanton, Retail Gasoline Pricing: What Do We Know? (February 1, 2008). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 290, Original Release: May 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=990343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990343

Daniel S. Hosken (Contact Author)

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Christopher T. Taylor

U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )

601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Antitrust Division
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Robert Stanton McMillan

Cauchy Capital

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