Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation

45 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2007 Last revised: 26 Aug 2008

See all articles by Astrid Dannenberg

Astrid Dannenberg

University of Gothenburg

Thomas Riechmann

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Bodo Sturm

Leipzig University of Applied Sciences - HTWK Leipzig

Carsten Vogt

Zentrum fuer EuropSische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research), Environmental & Resource Economics

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.

Keywords: individual preferences, inequity aversion, experimental economics, public goods

JEL Classification: C91, C92, H41

Suggested Citation

Dannenberg, Astrid and Riechmann, Thomas and Sturm, Bodo and Vogt, Carsten, Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation (2007). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 07-034, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991555

Astrid Dannenberg (Contact Author)

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

Thomas Riechmann

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Universitätspl. 2
PSF 4120
Magdeburg, D-39106
Germany

Bodo Sturm

Leipzig University of Applied Sciences - HTWK Leipzig ( email )

Leipzig
Germany

Carsten Vogt

Zentrum fuer EuropSische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research), Environmental & Resource Economics ( email )

Eco-management
D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211235200 (Phone)
+49 6211235226 (Fax)

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