Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Dutch First Price Auctions for Public Service Provision

13 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2007 Last revised: 12 Dec 2012

Laura Levaggi

Free University of Bozen - Faculty of Science and Technology

Rosella Levaggi

University of Brescia - Department of Economics and Management

Date Written: June 8, 2009

Abstract

Public service provision has undergone a significant process of reform which aim at increasing efficiency of the system and improving welfare. In most cases the regulator has to determine the reimbursement for the provider without observing costs. Another important characteristic of public service provision is related to workers' motivation, acting as private information rent to the provider. In this paper we analyse Dutch first price auction mechanisms to introduce competition in the market as a way to regulate the market in order to extract the information rent from the provider. In particular, single service and multiple object auctions are compared.

Keywords: Auction, N goods, private information

JEL Classification: C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Levaggi, Laura and Levaggi, Rosella, Dutch First Price Auctions for Public Service Provision (June 8, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=992660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.992660

Laura Levaggi (Contact Author)

Free University of Bozen - Faculty of Science and Technology ( email )

Universit├Ątsplatzt, 1
Bozen, 39100
Italy

Rosella Levaggi

University of Brescia - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via San Faustino 74B
Brescia, 25122
Italy
+39 03 0298 8825 (Phone)
+39 03 0298 8837 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eco.unibs.it/segdse/rlev/index.htm

Paper statistics

Downloads
3
Abstract Views
195