Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus

28 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2007  

Catherine Roux

University of Basel

Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg

University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 2007

Abstract

We examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms' whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.

Keywords: Amnesty Plus, self-reporting, antitrust, multimarket contact

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41

Suggested Citation

Roux, Catherine and von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas, Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus (May 2007). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1995. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=992686

Catherine Roux (Contact Author)

University of Basel

Basel
Switzerland

Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg

University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP) ( email )

BFSH1
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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