Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
28 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2007
Date Written: May 2007
We examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms' whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.
Keywords: Amnesty Plus, self-reporting, antitrust, multimarket contact
JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
By Michele Polo and Massimo Motta
Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust
Divide Et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
By J. Gregory Sidak, Michael K. Block, ...
By Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg, ...