How Well Do Social Ratings Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?

51 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2007 Last revised: 22 Feb 2008

See all articles by Aaron Chatterji

Aaron Chatterji

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

David I. Levine

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Michael W. Toffel

Harvard Business School

Date Written: February 20, 2008

Abstract

Ratings of corporations' environmental activities and capabilities influence billions of dollars of socially responsible investments as well as some consumers, activists, and potential employees. In one of the first studies to assess these ratings, we examine how well the most widely used ratings - those of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) - provide transparency about past and likely future environmental performance. We find KLD concern ratings to be fairly good summaries of past environmental performance. In addition, firms with more KLD concerns have slightly, but statistically significantly, more pollution and regulatory compliance violations in later years. KLD environmental strengths, in contrast, do not accurately predict pollution levels or compliance violations. Moreover, we find evidence that KLD's ratings are not optimally using publicly available data. We discuss the implications of our findings for advocates and opponents of corporate social responsibility as well as for studies that relate social responsibility ratings to financial performance.

Keywords: environmental management, corporate social responsibility, evaluation, ratings, regulation, compliance, emissions

JEL Classification: C23, K20, K32, K42, M14, O13, Q20, Q29

Suggested Citation

Chatterji, Aaron and Levine, David Ian and Toffel, Michael W., How Well Do Social Ratings Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility? (February 20, 2008). HBS Technology & Operations Mgt. Unit Research Paper No. 07-051, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=993094 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993094

Aaron Chatterji

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

David Ian Levine

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1697 (Phone)
510-643-1420 (Fax)

Michael W. Toffel (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617.384.8043 (Phone)

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