Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls

33 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2007

See all articles by Harrie A. A. Verbon

Harrie A. A. Verbon

Tilburg University - CentER; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 2007

Abstract

Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free migration from football players will be Pareto efficient under special circumstances only. This paper shows that transfer fees can correct inefficient migration flows from small to large football leagues. Home-grown rules that prescribe that a certain proportion of the roster of players should be trained within the club are very blunt devices for restoring efficiency, and perform worse than transfer fee systems.

Keywords: football transfers, migration equilibrium, social welfare

JEL Classification: H77, J61, L83

Suggested Citation

Verbon, Harrie A. A., Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls (May 2007). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=993366

Harrie A. A. Verbon (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 28 78 (Phone)
+31 13 466 30 42 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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