Technology and Liquidity Provision: The Blurring of Traditional Definitions

46 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2007 Last revised: 30 Apr 2008

See all articles by Joel Hasbrouck

Joel Hasbrouck

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Gideon Saar

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Date Written: December 30, 2007

Abstract

Limit orders are usually viewed as patiently supplying liquidity. We investigate the trading of one hundred Nasdaq-listed stocks on INET, a limit order book. In contrast to the usual view, we find that over one-third of nonmarketable limit orders are cancelled within two seconds. We investigate the role these "fleeting orders" play in the market and test specific hypotheses about their uses. We find evidence consistent with dynamic trading strategies whereby traders chase market prices or search for latent liquidity. We show that fleeting orders are a relatively recent phenomenon, and suggest that they have arisen from a combination of factors that includes improved technology, an active trading culture, market fragmentation, and an increasing utilization of latent liquidity.

Keywords: fleeting orders, INET, limit orders, ECN, trading strategies, hidden liquidity, dark liquidity, supplying liquidity, demanding liquidity, technology, active trading, market fragmentation, duration analysis, survival analysis, limit order cancellation, proportional hazards model

JEL Classification: G1

Suggested Citation

Hasbrouck, Joel and Saar, Gideon, Technology and Liquidity Provision: The Blurring of Traditional Definitions (December 30, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=994369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.994369

Joel Hasbrouck

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

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Gideon Saar (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

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HOME PAGE: https://www.johnson.cornell.edu/Faculty-And-Research/Profile?id=gs25

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

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