Labor Market Effects of Employer-Provided Health Insurance

19 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2007

See all articles by Katerina Sherstyuk

Katerina Sherstyuk

University of Hawaii - Department of Economics

Yoav Wachsman

Coastal Carolina University - Wall College of Business

Gerard Russo

University of Hawaii - Department of Economics

Abstract

This is an experimental study in economics of mandated benefits. Most individuals who have health insurance in the United States obtain it through their employer. Some states require employers to provide insurance to certain types of workers. We used an experimental laboratory to investigate possible effects of alternative health insurance regulations on the competitive labor market performance. We found that mandating the insurance for all workers creates labor market distortions, whereas mandating the insurance only for full-time workers leads to a higher coverage than under no mandate, an increased number of part-time workers, but does not necessarily lower market efficiency.

Suggested Citation

Sherstyuk, Katerina and Wachsman, Yoav and Russo, Gerard, Labor Market Effects of Employer-Provided Health Insurance. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 538-556, July 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=994411 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00016.x

Katerina Sherstyuk (Contact Author)

University of Hawaii - Department of Economics ( email )

Honolulu, HI 96822
United States
808-956-7851 (Phone)

Yoav Wachsman

Coastal Carolina University - Wall College of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 261954
Conway, SC 29528-6054
United States
(843) 349-2683 (Phone)
(843) 349-2455 (Fax)

Gerard Russo

University of Hawaii - Department of Economics ( email )

Honolulu, HI 96822
United States
(808) 956-7065 (Phone)
(808) 956-4347 (Fax)

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